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The Coleridgean Imagination: its Role in Thought and 
its Relation to Reason 
Peter Cheyne 
This paper traces the development of the Coleridgean imagination to its position at the heart 
of a broadly neoplatonic system merging associationist roots with kantian inspiration.  
Rather than the place of the imagination being supplanted in Coleridge’s later thinking (e.g., 
in Aids to Reflection (1825), and Church and State (1826)) by the role of platonic Ideas, I 
aim to show that the latter grew in prominence with the necessary groundwork having been 
laid by establishing the role of imagination in thought and its relation to Reason considered 
logically, and along platonic and neoplatonic lines, and not psychologically.  Coleridge’s 
theory of imagination was not just a brilliant theory of poetry; it was integral to a systematic 
philosophy that evinced as one example that from the very fact of poetry, the associationist 
philosophy of empiricism could not be a complete theory, but could only retain value as part 
of a larger system.  Far from being a brilliant theory that was later eclipsed in Coleridge’s 
writings by the theory of Ideas, I argue that the Coleridgean imagination can only be properly 
understood in terms of its necessity in bringing Reason explicitly to self-aware thought, and 
thus bringing Ideas to enlightened mind.  For this to be possible, it must first be 
acknowledged how and why the concepts of the understanding can only be enlightened by 
negative reason, and that imagination is necessary in order for thinking to be aware of 
Reason in its positive aspect. 
This paper is an exploration of the development of Coleridge’s theory of the 
imagination as his philosophical ideas evolved from enthusiasm for the British 
empiricism of the day, transforming his take on transcendental idealism towards a 
broadly neoplatonic system.  Coleridge’s thoughts turned towards the imagination 
as he tried to understand what made a poet and what distinguished good poetry 
from bad.  Since his school days at Christ’s Hospital, he held a conviction, instilled 
in him by his Headmaster, James Boyer1, “that poetry, even that of the loftiest, and, 
seemingly, that of the wildest odes, had a logic of its own, as severe as that of 
science; and more difficult, because more subtle, more complex, and dependent on 
more, and more fugitive causes.”2  Much of Coleridge’s life was spent in this 
difficult pursuit of poetry’s logic.   
Early in this pursuit, Coleridge was a follower of empiricist philosophy, 
believing association to be the important link between body and spirit.  
Associationism seemed to explain how the perceiving mind multiplies connections 
within experience, quite naturally producing similes and metaphors.  While 
associationism was just one aspect of Locke’s empiricism, David Hartley based his 
entire system on a theory of association by contiguity and repetition.  Although 
Hartley’s influence on Coleridge would not retain its central position, it was strong 
enough at the time for the poet to name his first son Hartley Coleridge.  
Coleridge was especially interested in Hartley’s theory because it progressed 
towards a kind of sublimation theory whereby the sense material became 
spiritualized.  “Some degree of spirituality”, wrote Hartley, “is the necessary 
consequence of passing through life. The sensible pleasures and pains must be 
transferred by association more and more every day, upon things that afford neither 
sensible pleasure nor sensible pain in themselves, and so beget the intellectual 
pleasures and pains.”  In ‘Religious Musings’, Coleridge hails Hartley as “of mortal 
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kind / Wisest”, because he essayed to establish value on a materialistic and scientific 
footing and was the “first who marked the ideal tribes / Up the fine fibres through 
the sentient brain”.3 
Coleridge would grow to criticize the associationist philosophers in the 
strongest terms, but would never jettison the theory from his system.  
Associationism remained within the Coleridgean system, holding a place around the 
lower rungs of his ladder between nature and reason.  The lower levels progressed 
from nature, through sensation and then fancy to the lower understanding, then to 
the higher levels, from higher understanding, through imagination to reason, the 
station after which is reached the ultimate truth: logos, or God.  Conceiving this 
scheme as a ladder shows the order that Coleridge had in mind.  Coleridge 
described his system as a polarity, as in a bar magnet, with reason and sense being 
the upper and lower counterparts.  Imagination and fancy occupied the next upper 
and lower positions. A higher and a lower understanding were then lodged in the 
middle of the polarity, between fancy and imagination.   
Analogies always break down, and we must be cautious not to assess 
Coleridge as a faculty psychologist. He was careful to emphasize that his was no 
faculty psychology, and that talking of sense, fancy, understanding, imagination, 
and reason was not to assume discrete faculties, but was rather a way of describing 
different kinds of basic mental processing, different kinds of creative mental activity.  
For Coleridge, each process involves the whole, in that an act of understanding, for 
example, involves and requires the contributions of associated fancy.  Coleridge 
never considered such processes and activities in a way that was not holistic, or 
organicist, to prefer a term of his own coinage.  We must bear with any 
appearances of faculty psychology in his system, and construe them as scaffolding, 
helping to form a modeled ensemble of the reality that Coleridge essayed to convey.   
Association drove Hartley’s entire psychology, whereas in Coleridge’s system 
association operates only at the level of the fancy.  Here, fancy processes for the 
lower understanding the materials provided by senses.  The fancy provides the 
lower understanding with counters garnered from sense experience to be worked 
into concepts.  Thus the understanding can then abstract from experience, gaining a 
concept of “outness”, as Coleridge termed the sense of externality.  Proceeding 
from this outness we conceive ourselves as detached individuals.  This faculty of 
understanding (Coleridge’s lower understanding) is concerned with concepts 
abstracted from experience and leads to an alienation that would be final if the 
associationist philosophy were the ultimate word in human psychology.  The sense 
of individuality presented by the understanding is a personal unity consisting, 
negatively, in division from the main.  It is the subjective residue after the objective 
entities in experience have been abstracted.  This provides a sense of being an 
observer and an agent, a self who is able to observe and in turn act upon passive 
nature only in virtue of being cut off from it.  The romantic gist is familiar.  Within 
the realm of instinct and pre-reflective experience, the mind is at one with nature; 
with conceptual understanding comes the divorce.   
Further in his theory, Coleridge saw a higher reunion with nature through the 
mediation of the imagination bringing the ideas of reason down to the higher 
understanding.  This reunion, displacing the sense of detachment with a higher 
order of attachment, must have felt like the source of a great hope for Coleridge.  
This was both a personal hope and a hope to remedy many of the ills of the age, the 
age of enlightenment, which he was the first to describe as “the age of anxiety”.  
For the mechanist and associationist philosophers, standing at the position that 
Coleridge calls the lower understanding would have represented the ascent to the 
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apex of human ability, standing proudly detached on a Himalayan peak, above and 
detached from a world it may now survey aloof with the clarity of distance.  For 
Coleridge, on the other hand, the feeling would have been one of embarrassment 
and disappointment.  “Is this it?”, he might have asked himself.  Coleridge 
warned that to position the understanding as the crowning glory of humanity to be 
revered as an end in itself would make of us, “a race of animals, in whom the 
presence of reason is manifested solely by the absence of instinct.” 
We may turn to a margin note that Coleridge wrote in his copy of 
Tennemann’s Gesichte der Philosophie in order to clarify the outline of his system.4 
Here he wrote that, “The simplest yet practically sufficient order of the Mental 
Powers is, beginning from the 
lowest highest 
  
Sense Reason 
Fancy Imagination 
Understanding Understanding 
------------ ------------ 
Understanding Understanding 
Imagination Fancy 
Reason Sense 
lowest highest 
 
The polarities in the diagram can be clearly seen.  From the lowest to the 
highest orders we move from sense to reason.  Sense and reason are counterparts, 
as are fancy and imagination, with the lower and higher understandings being 
counterparts around the centre.  Owen Barfield has noted, in What Coleridge Thought,  
that these complementarities are like octaves, and that there is more in common (in 
tune) between reason and sense than between reason and understanding, even 
though understanding is closer to it in the system as represented.5  Coleridge 
complained that for the empiricists of his day, the lower understanding represented 
the apex of human thought and development.  At this point Coleridge draws a bar, 
just before the higher understanding.  Elsewhere, Coleridge remarked that the 
genius of Aristotle’s understanding was a cloud that prevented his being able to see 
what Plato indicated in his theory of Ideas.  This cloud is like the bar between 
Coleridge’s lower and higher understanding.  Beyond this bar is all that lies beyond 
the empirical theories, all that is not dreamt of in that philosophy. 
In his theory of imagination and reason, Coleridge perceived rays of hope in a 
human reunion with nature and the source of the principles of the universe, which 
source and principles, cognate with the logos of tradition, he opposed to the 
abstracted rules culled by the understanding from the senses.  For Coleridge this 
would have seemed a prospect worthy of life.  The reunion with reason is indeed a 
higher reunion in this system because, for Coleridge, reason was present in nature 
but only present to the higher understanding.  It is apparent here that the reason 
Coleridge had in mind was that of a logos implicit in nature, and not just a faculty of 
human discourse.   
With the presence of reason reaching a level of awareness in the higher 
understanding, a new horizon beyond fixed and definite concepts could be 
glimpsed, however dimly this might first appear. This was the vision that Coleridge 
aspired to convey to his age, a vision that he believed his contemporaries, especially 
his compatriots, sorely needed.  Coleridge diagnosed the intellectual malady of his 
day with his observation that, “The histories and political economy of the present 
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and preceding century partake in the general contagion of its mechanistic 
philosophy, and are the product of an unenlivened understanding.”6  Coleridge 
noted that, “the Present is the Epoch of the Understanding and the Senses” because 
the understanding, though it has access to ideas of reason through its power to 
abstract, is turned back, in its search for knowledge, to the impressions of sense once 
the reason in its positive aspect is denied. 
From this position, we note that Coleridge did not disparage the fancy and 
the understanding; he simply cautioned that they should not be overestimated.  
Just as genius requires talent as its counterpart, so imagination depends upon fancy, 
with the higher faculties using the energy and materials of the lower.   Fancy was 
for Coleridge the offspring of association, providing to the understanding “fixities 
and definites” from experience, which could use them as counters transformed into 
concepts.  The important thing in Coleridge’s caution was that we should not fail to 
see that the step from fancy to understanding has its higher counterpart in the step 
from imagination to reason.   
In Coleridge’s system, fancy has an important role in the generation of 
consciousness, converting perceptions into memories and streaming these together 
according to their spatio-temporal associations.  Although fancy converts 
perceptions into memories, the primary imagination is responsible for the formation 
of perceptions themselves out of sensations and stimuli. Because the primary 
imagination organizes and shapes perceptions, by synthesizing in Kantian fashion 
the materials of sense experience with concepts from the understanding, our 
experience is intelligible.  The fancy is able to use these percepts for the creation of 
its “fixities and definites”.  Debased, however, into passive fancy, it can lead to “the 
film of familiarity and selfish solicitude”7, by which we enter “the lethargy of 
custom, having eyes, yet see not, ears yet hear not.” 8  In passive fancy, the 
conceivable is reduced to the bounds of the merely picturable. 
We have just noted that the fancy requires the organizing and shaping 
activity, which activity Coleridge called esemplastic, of the primary imagination in 
order to receive its materials. 9  This primary imagination is what Coleridge also 
called “the necessary imagination”, necessary because it was a condition of 
perception.  The primary imagination is spontaneous, fusing sensations and 
concepts into meaningful experience. As such it corresponds to Kant’s empirical 
degree of the imagination, and its transcendental schematism of concepts and 
intuitions, producing intelligible experience.   
The secondary imagination is not spontaneous, but voluntary.  This creative 
power can remain dormant in individuals, or it can be stirred to activity, becoming 
the poetic or the philosophic imagination.  This voluntary imagination is a superior 
degree of the same imagination responsible for the spontaneous shaping of 
perception.  It exists in all people but is not equally developed in all, and it 
represents the fullest exertion of the self, controlled by “the free-will, our only 
absolute self.”10  Because the secondary imagination is voluntary, its acts of creation 
and recreation carry a personal, moral and social responsibility.  The secondary 
imagination uses materials gathered and shaped by the primary imagination, able to 
idealize and unify these into harmony with the whole mind and not just with the 
understanding.  Thus the secondary imagination may create and recreate according 
to the energies of reason.  Although not everybody achieves the poetic imagination, 
everybody is more or less able to appreciate the fruits of poetic imagination.  As 
Coleridge said, to hear a poem as a poem one must become, for at least that short 
time, a poet.11  Once the artist has created the artwork, be it poem, painting, musical 
composition, and so on, the finished result can then be approached, via the senses, 
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by the imagination and understanding of the public.  The same goes for work in 
philosophy. 
The secondary imagination can work as poetic or philosophic imagination.  
This philosophic imagination is a transcendental power whose “sources must be far 
higher and far inward”12 from the ordinary mode of consciousness.  It is “the 
sacred power of self-intuition,”13, able to work from that command descended from 
the heavens, as Coleridge was fond of quoting, the Delphic locution: “Know 
thyself!”  In philosophic consciousness, the imagination intuitively contemplates its 
intuitive knowledge of the world, relating this consciousness to nature.  Because 
the self is constitutive, the mind realizes that in self-contemplation it has also 
already been contemplating nature as natura naturans (nature naturing, the processes 
of nature) and not just the apparent phenomena of nature as natura naturata (nature 
natured, the outward forms of nature).  Thus Coleridge takes further than Kant the 
insight, made in The Critique of Practical Reason, that we have access to at least one 
noumenon, or thing-in-itself, namely the self. 
This self we simultaneously are and perceive, although the perceived self is 
distinguished by being a reflection, an empirical phenomenon, rather than the thing-
in-itself in the immediate first person.  Although Kant was very cautious about the 
ramifications of this insight (referring to the transcendental ego as beyond the laws 
of phenomena, with the empirical ego being a phenomenon subject to psychological 
laws), thinkers such as Schopenhauer, Fichte, and Schelling sought in the noumenal 
self who we are an entrance into the wider universe of transcendental reality and a 
return to metaphysics as such, rather than a kantian metaphysics of metaphysics.  
Coleridge thought that the self-intuition of the philosophic imagination had direct 
access to natura naturans in virtue of having this mode of reality itself.  This does 
not, however, place him in quite the same post-kantian camp of metaphysics as 
Schopenhauer, because Coleridge understood nature to be “the term in which we 
comprehend all things that are representable in the forms of time and space, and 
subjected to the relations of cause and effect: and the cause of the existence of which, 
therefore, is to be sought for perpetually in something antecedent.”14 
Nevertheless, the philosophic imagination is, Coleridge thought, in a position 
to bring the ideas of intuitive reason, which are not phenomenal and not subject to 
cause and effect, down to the higher understanding.  In this respect, the 
philosophic imagination is the counterpart of the primary imagination, which brings 
the materials of sensation up to the lower understanding.  Fancy mobilizes the 
stream of association of fixities and definites taken from perception, offering them 
up to the understanding as ready-mades or objets trouvés.  The understanding may 
then formulate a picture model of the world, wherein only the imageable is accepted 
as the conceivable.  This was the thinking process, Coleridge noted, standardly 
theorized by the materialists.  In one of many examples of this process of thinking, 
Coleridge spoke in his philosophical lectures of Locke’s insistence that we need 
distinct images when defining words and concepts.  We may further note that 
Locke’s insistence is in line with Aristotle, contra Plato, who held, in On the Soul 
(Part VII), that the soul never thinks without an image. 
Coleridge warned against mistaking distinct images for clear conceptions.  
For Coleridge, a very useful aspect of fancy was that it presented its fixed and 
definite images, and presenting also what we may call auditory compounds, tactile 
compounds, taste compounds, and olfactory compounds, in the flowing stream of 
association.  It is over this stream that the thinker, in the act of composition or in 
the ordinary act of trying to recollect a name, a word, or a face, and so on, rests, like 
a pond-skater, to use Coleridge’s emblem of the process, sometimes resisting the 
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stream’s current,i.e. associationist fancy, sometimes allowing itself to be carried 
along by it, winning its way, until it makes the exertion, the moment of will and 
choice, to reach the sought for object.   
At this point we are drawn to inquire into what the ideas of reason, to be 
conveyed to the higher understanding, are.  The lower understanding conceives 
according to the perception of phenomena (natura naturata), “the sum total of the 
facts and phenomena of the senses”.  Natura naturans, on the other hand, denotes 
the essential power behind  natura, or physis in the Greek.   This essence is that 
phenomena are always in the process of becoming, and we can always seek the 
antecedent phenomenon or phenomena of any given phenomenon.  The distinction 
between natura naturata and naturans is supported by the insight that the laws of 
phenomena are not themselves phenomena.  When hearing that something being 
talked about is not a phenomenon, not an object to be perceived, most people will 
assume it to be an abstraction.  But the referents of natura naturans are no more 
abstractions, and are no less real, than, for example, gravity.15  This distinction, 
using Latinized terms from Aristotle, subsequently adopted and adapted by Spinoza, 
is related to Coleridge’s insight that the act of thinking is not itself a thought.  The 
act of thinking is often unconscious, while the products of the act, thoughts, are 
what achieve consciousness.  On those occasions when we do think self-consciously, 
it is sometimes possible to snatch the thinking away from the product of the act.  
The result of thinking, the thought, is part of the “spontaneous consciousness 
natural to all reflecting beings.”16  The thinking itself, Coleridge observed, is not so 
spontaneously conscious on a natural level. 
The act of thinking (e.g., constructing, in imagination, a line without breadth) 
is more perfect, more adequate to the idea in a platonic sense, than the more easily 
reproduced and schematized representation of that act (e.g., the image of a line).  
An example given by Coleridge is when connecting two stars as extremities of a line.  
He felt the sensation, as it were, of a perfect length without breadth.  This is an act 
of the imagination the representation of which might be a line drawn or scratched on 
a surface to represent the ideal.  In the same way, he suggests, natural laws are 
neither things (phenomena) nor abstractions.  We might arrive at knowledge, or at 
least working hypotheses, of natural laws through abstraction from experiment, but 
that is not what the laws actually are.  Because the prevailing empirical philosophy 
in his day, at least in Britain, worked under the belief that every possible object of 
knowledge was either a phenomenon or an abstraction from such, and because it 
was no longer inspired by the inquiry into physis (the coming into being of beings) as 
such, Coleridge observed that “we have not yet attained to a science of nature.”17 
The understanding, working only with those functions proper to it, can deal 
only with phenomena and the causal relations between them.  Delving deeply into 
phenomena, the understanding is led to other phenomena, until it becomes stuck.  
The understanding might then find itself faced with what Coleridge called proto-
phenomena, or the Ur-phänomene of Goethe.  Or it might reach the technical limits 
of experimental possibility.  It is at such points that the understanding’s spade 
must turn, failing to dig further.  Unable to make progress, the understanding 
conveys the proto-phenomena, or the thus-far ultimate results of state-of-the-art 
experimentation, for the contemplation of the imagination. For the understanding to 
inquire behind proto-phenomena in search of yet more underlying phenomena 
would be for it to turn itself over to fancy and to invent picture-theories of material 
states of affairs: turtles all the way down, one might say. A representative sample of 
Coleridge’s proto-phenomena would contain, among other examples, the 
phenomena of magnetism, of electricity, of crystal formation, of organic growth and 
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many observable processes of life and mind.  From these proto-phenomena, 
Coleridge asserted, in keeping with his reading of Giordano Bruno and Jacob Böhme 
(“Behmen” in Coleridge’s writings), we may deduce the most general law to be 
“polarity, or the essential dualism of Nature, arising out of its productive unity, and 
still tending to reaffirm it, either as equilibrium, indifference or identity”.18 
Coleridge places “the mystery and dignity of human nature” in the 
foundation that reason provides for individual personality.  This reason is only 
reason insofar as it “is of universal validity and obligatory on all mankind.”  This is 
the same insight reached by Heraclitus:   “Although the Logos is common to all, 
most men live as if each had a private intelligence of his own.”  Thinking is an act 
that individuates the thinker.  The thinker judges the verity of propositions and 
ascertains states of affairs by engaging in the act of thinking.  This act is a 
detachment insofar as it employs concepts that have been abstracted from reality in 
the polarization of experience into the thinking subject and its thoughts about world.  
This act is also a reattachment insofar as it commits itself to a true approach to the 
real state of affairs.  The individual grasps and feels her individuality in the act of 
thinking, the product of which (viz. the thought) can be conveyed to other thinking 
beings who in their turn are able to test its verity, to compare its message to their 
own experience, and to hold the thought up to the light, as it were, of reason.  It is 
“the queen bee in the hive of error,” Coleridge cautioned, to believe that the same 
idea in two minds is two ideas and not one.  As ever, Coleridge stated his 
platonism in unambiguous terms.   
The ideas of reason are of higher origin than the notions of the 
understanding; it is by their irradiation that the understanding itself becomes a 
human understanding.  If the understanding ignores the downshine, as it were, of 
reason, then it will remain a mere, rather than a fully human, understanding.  This 
was precisely the danger facing his empirically reductionist contemporaries.  The 
mere understanding would have no role other than to order sense data according to 
cause and effect, and to assign concepts to them.  The name truth would denote 
nothing beyond personal sincerity, as each individual would conceive their concepts 
idiosyncratically unique, varying to greater or lesser degrees from what we might be 
able to call corresponding concepts in the understandings of other individuals.   
Such is the expression of personality, or rather of idiosyncrasy, that appears 
when understanding is held to be the end and apex of the human mind.  It would 
have no other faculty to assist when it reaches its limits, the limits of being able to 
find only phenomena behind phenomena until it reaches proto-phenomena.  No 
other, that is, than the fancy, which then fabricates from its fixities and definites 
images of hypothesized phenomena that might appear if only we could somehow get 
closer to them.  The alternative, that of informing the understanding with 
imagination and reason, illuminates personality “when this light shines downward 
into the understanding it is always more or less refracted, and differently in every 
individual.”  Reason distinguishes the understanding with individuality rather 
than detachment, and it was part of Coleridge’s romantic ambition to so heal this 
detachment. 
In keeping with his central philosophy of polarity, Coleridge divides reason 
into two modalities: negative and positive reason.  Negative reason operates, 
however unselfconsciously, in the understanding, enabling the latter faculty to 
abstract in terms of universals.  Negative reason is still reason, it is just not 
conscious and it operates only to the degree with which the understanding can cope.  
It is this ability that forces the understanding’s detachment from nature.  Now the 
understanding, as subjectivity, utilizes its ability to compare and contrast its objects 
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into the categories of sameness and difference.   This negative reason consists in 
the “power of seeing, whether any two conceptions, which happen to be in mind, 
are, or are not, in contradiction with each other.”19 
Negative reason retains only the mechanical, separable elements of 
experience.  It deals with natura naturata and is not equipped to approach natura 
naturans.  Such an understanding, if left to stand alone, analyzes to the point of 
leaving a notion of nature bereft of life.  The principle of contradiction, which 
operates as the negative reason in the understanding, can work only within the 
sphere of fixities and definites.  With entities considered in detachment, the 
understanding cannot work with nature in its natural state of flux.  Natura naturans 
cannot be caught in the net of this stop-start Eleatic reasoning.  Negative reasoning, 
which is the understanding working only with negative reason, becomes a master of 
distinction and division.  It is able to compartmentalize every element of nature by 
understanding what each thing is not in relation to other things, yet remains quite 
unable to state positively what anything essentially is.  But even through this stage 
a glimmer of reason in its positive mode may shine, for the principle of contradiction 
has the quality of universality, which may impress the understanding such that the 
“unindividual and transcendent character of the Reason as a presence to the mind” 
awakens.20 
When the principle of contradiction itself is considered, the understanding 
must turn its attentions away from the outward sense and reflect inwards and 
upwards, if we may employ a hasty visual metaphor for this mental process.   The 
reflection would turn “inwards” because attention would be forced away from what 
common sense takes to be outward objects and “upwards” because for Coleridge, 
reason is above, as it were, nature.  Reason is above nature in that while Coleridge 
considered sense, fancy and the understanding to be a part of nature, he held reason 
to be somehow above nature, although he did not consider it entirely apart from 
nature.  This is because he held reason to be present in every level of being by, as 
the metaphor goes, shining down upon it.   
An example of the Coleridgean downshine of Reason is in the notion of 
instinct as potential intelligence.  When the understanding turns from outward 
objects to consider the principle of contradiction itself, it turns from natura naturata 
towards natura naturans.  Such is the move from fancy’s aggregating the “products 
of destruction, the cadavera rerum” 21  to imagination’s finding itself, as natura 
naturans, in the unity of the polarities it perceives as the higher unity of 
contradictories.  Contemplation of the principle of contradiction has this somewhat 
revolutionary effect in Coleridge’s system because therein the understanding may 
be led to inquire into that which indicates contradictories as such.  If reason in its 
passive mode can indicate contradictories, it must itself transcend contradictories in 
order to draw them together  as presentations to the understanding, which may 
then hold them apart.  The first glimpse of Coleridgean reason is in polarity:  one 
power manifest as two forces. 
Polarity, “a living and generative interpenetration,”22 may not be grasped by 
the naked understanding, which conceives of everything in detachment, related 
indeed by cause and effect, but only mechanically related.  It is the imagination that 
must lay hold of polarity.  Where the understanding as negative reason grasps 
logical opposites (contradictories), the imagination holds polar opposites, which are 
mutually generative, inclusive and not exclusive, and therefore capable of 
distinction, but not of division.  Coleridge found imagination between the 
understanding and reason (above understanding and below reason), rather than 
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below and between the understanding and intuition as Kant first placed it, or as a 
compartment within the conceptual understanding, as Kant later revised his scheme.   
Between understanding and reason, Coleridge’s imagination is a bridge 
between the two, which is seen clearly in the scale, reproduced above, that Coleridge 
sketched in the margin of his copy of Tennenann’s Geschichte der Philosophie.  This 
sketch schematizes the Coleridgean system of faculties in terms of the lowest and 
highest in the human scale.  That Coleridge drew these scales twice, laying them 
side by side with the lowest to highest on the left and the highest to lowest on the 
right highlights how the faculties are complementaries on a pole.  The polarity is 
emphasized by his inclusion of a bar, on both scales, between the higher and lower 
understanding.  When the understanding is, as Coleridge described it, 
“impregnated” with the imagination, then the understanding “becomes intuitive, 
and a living power.”23 
The scale sketched in Tennemann describes the faculties in their order from 
the lowest level, from sense to reason, and from the highest level.  The scales are 
drawn twice, in opposite orders, suggesting their mutual and corresponding 
generativity.  In Coleridge’s writings, reason is described as above both nature and 
the human scale, such that the human search for wisdom may approach reason, with 
that reason to be considered a “gift”, rather than a faculty.  On first appearances 
Coleridge presents us with what seems clearly to be a faculty psychology, yet he 
consistently denies that these powers are discrete faculties.  When considered in 
terms of what we might loosely call the epistemological pole, the powers are seen in 
their proper light and then seen as incapable of division and separate operation, 
although for the purposes of inquiry they have been found to be distinguishable.  A 
telling observation of Coleridge’s is that, “it is a dull and obtuse mind, that must 
divide in order to distinguish; but it is a still worse, that distinguishes in order to 
divide.” 24 Furthermore, Coleridge notes, “in every act of mind the man unites the 
properties of sense, understanding and reason.  Nevertheless it is of great practical 
importance, that these distinctions should be made and understood.”25  Coleridge 
held that the primary and secondary imaginations were one power expressing 
different modes of operation.  The secondary imagination, poetic or philosophic, 
unites the clarity of the understanding with the depth of reason, while the primary 
imagination, this time unconscious in its operation, unites “the plenitude of the 
sense with the comprehensibility of the understanding.”26  It is the imagination that 
generates symbols through which may be conveyed the ideas of reason, and it is this 
idea Coleridge expresses in the following definition of the imagination:  “That 
reconciling and mediatory power, which incorporating the reason in images of the 
sense, and organizing (as it were) the flux of the senses by the permanence and self-
circling energies of reason, gives birth to a system of symbols, harmonious in 
themselves, and consubstantial with the truths of which they are the conductors.”27  
By virtue of the imagination’s sensual ‘incorporations’ of reason, its symbols are 
‘consubstantial’ with the conducted truths of reason.  Such, for Coleridge, is 
imagination’s role in the human connection with reason in its positive mode. 
While reason (in its negative mode) in the understanding gives rise to 
contradiction, reason in the imagination gives rise to the unity of experienced nature.  
The constantly changing and aspect-shifting appearances of phenomena 28  are 
related, by the imagination, to the permanent “energies of reason” (A Lay Sermon). 
This relation allows consciousness a temporality, an access to time, by virtue of 
being aware of mutable presences with their essences. 
From Chapter V of Biographia Literaria, Coleridge begins his history and 
critique of association “traced from Aristotle to Hartley.”  Aristotle emerges from 
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this critique relatively unscathed.  Coleridge judges that “the wise Stagyrite” 
delivered a “just theory without pretending to an hypothesis”, which is to say that 
Aristotle delivered his survey of the observed facts of association without placing 
these within the framework of a guiding fiction or fancied state-of-affairs.  The 
same cannot be said of the modern associationist theories that Coleridge targeted.  
Descartes, for example, assumed nervous spirits to drive association by etching and 
re-etching “engravings on the brain”.   Other associationists supposed this 
movement to be more mechanical than nerve-spiritual.  Later proponents of 
associationism hypothesized ether oscillating along solid fibres and hollow tubes.  
Later still, in Coleridge’s day, theories involved electric light or the elective affinity 
of chemical compositions as driving association.  Coleridge’s objection to these 
hypotheses was threefold: they were more unfounded flights of fancy than proper 
science; they were created in the thrall of “the despotism of the eye”, as if these 
physical relations could be seen, requiring only a powerful enough microscope to be 
made; they were metaphysically materialistic, whereas Aristotle’s original theory 
had the virtue of being ontologically neutral. 
Coleridge did not wish to do away with the theory of association; indeed he 
retained it within his system as the “universal law of passive fancy” 29, supplying 
objects to other faculties.   
The image-forming or rather re-forming power, the imagination in its passive sense, which I 
would rather call Fancy=Phantasy, a phainein, this, the Fetisch & Talisman of all modern 
Philosophers (the Germans excepted) may not inaptly be compared to the Gorgon Head, 
which looked death into every thing and this not by accident, but from the nature of the 
faculty itself, the province of which is to give consciousness to the Subject by presenting to it 
its conceptions objectively but the Soul differences itself from any other Soul for the purposes 
of symbolical knowledge by form or body only, but all form as body, i.e. as shape, & not as 
forma efformans30, is dead.  Life may be inferred, even as intelligence is from black marks on 
white paper, but the black marks themselves are truly “the dead letter”.  Here then is the 
error, not in the faculty itself, without which there would be no fixation, consequently, no 
distinct perception or conception, but in the gross idolatry of those who abuse it, & make that 
the goal & end which should only be a means of arriving at it.  It is any excuse to him who 
treats a living being as inanimate Body, that we cannot arrive at the knowledge of the living 
Being but thro’ the Body which is its Symbol & outward & visible Sign?31 
In this passage, empiricism is alluded to as a dead system, looking death into 
all it gazes on, and Locke’s simile of a blank tablet for the human mind is referred to 
as truly dead.  The chief error is to take the products of fancy as the highest end 
and purpose of the human mind, when it is rather a means, albeit a necessary one, in 
the process of forming concepts from experience.    The Lockean theory and, a 
fortiori, the wholly associationist Hartleian system, envision picture-theories of 
mind that achieve their end in the formation of concepts and the flow of associated 
images and concepts. Coleridge shrewdly observed that these theories fully apply 
not to the human mind taken as a whole, but only, and even then not completely, to 
a state of giddiness or delirium:  “There is in truth but one state to which this 
theory applies at all, namely, that of complete light-headedness; and even to this it 
applies but partially, because the will and reason are perhaps never wholly 
suspended.”32 
Coleridge held that the result of perception is neither a true subject nor true 
object but rather the most original union of both.  This union is a chief effect of the 
primary imagination.  Imagination blends thoughts and intuitions allowing for the 
very possibility of perception and, after that, allowing us to see beyond transitory 
phenomena into what Coleridge often referred to as the life of things:  natura 
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naturans.  Coleridge did not expect his ideas to be well received, or even 
understood by the empiricists of his day: 
“Every system, which is under the necessity of using terms not familiarized by the 
metaphysics in fashion, will be described as written in an unintelligible style, and the author 
must expect the charge of having substituted learned jargon for clear conception; while, 
according to the creed of our modern philosophers, nothing is deemed a clear conception, 
but what is representable by a distinct image. Thus the conceivable is reduced within the 
bounds of the picturable.”33 
Coleridge’s position regarding the imagination in Bigraphia Literaria had been 
germinating for at least twenty years.  In his lecture on the slave trade, Coleridge 
presented his earliest definition of the imagination.  The imitation of creativeness 
by combination would, twenty years later, become the fancy and imagination would 
retain its key position in Coleridge’s thinking.  In this early statement we see that 
Coleridge places his hope for humanity not in the self-satisfied delight of 
creativeness through combination, but in the splendid possibilities and real 
excellence that imagination inspires.  Without imagination, the optimistic motive 
for social improvement would be doomed to wither and fail.  The dying motive to 
be revivified was the feeling of hope inspired by the early days of the French 
Revolution. Coleridge’s theory of the imagination aspired to be more than merely a 
tool to understand the difference between good poetry and bad. 
To develope the powers of the Creator is our proper employment – and to imitate 
Creativeness by combination our most exalted and self-satisfying Delight.  But we are 
progressive and must not rest content with present Blessings.  Our Almighty Parent hath 
therefore given to us Imagination that stimulates to the attainment of real excellence by the 
contemplation of splendid Possibilities that still revivifies the dying motive within us, and 
fixing our eye on the glittering Summits that rise one above the other in the Alpine 
endlessness still urges us up the ascent of Being, amusing the ruggedness of the road with 
the beauty and grandeur of the ever-widening Prospect.  Such and so noble are the ends for 
which this restless faculty was given us – but horrible has been its misapplication. 
‘Lecture on the Slave Trade’, 16th June 1795. 
Twenty years later Coleridge wrote his most famous paragraphs on fancy and 
imagination: 
The imagination then I consider either as primary, or secondary.  The primary imagination I 
hold to be the living power and prime agent of all human perception, and as a repetition in 
the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite I AM. The secondary I consider as 
an echo of the former, co-existing with the conscious will, yet still as identical with the 
primary in the kind of its agency, and differing only in degree, and in the mode of its 
operation.  It dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, in order to re-create; or where this process is 
rendered impossible, yet still, at all events it struggles to idealize and to unify.  It is 
essentially vital, even as all objects (as objects) are essentially fixed and dead. 
Fancy, on the contrary, has no other counters to play with but fixities and definites.  The 
fancy is indeed no other than a mode of memory emancipated from the order of time and 
space; and blended with, and modified by that empirical phaenomenon of the will which we 
express with the word choice.  But equally with the ordinary memory it must receive all its 
materials ready made from the law of association. 
Biographia Literaria, Vol. 1, Chapter XIII. 
Coleridge dictated these arresting sentences in the summer of 1815, as he did 
the majority of Biographia Literaria. Fancy is entirely distinguished from imagination, 
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enjoying its play with fixities and definites.  The last sentence of Chapter XIV rates 
fancy as “drapery”:  “Finally, GOOD SENSE is the BODY of poetic genius, FANCY 
its DRAPERY, MOTION its LIFE, and IMAGINATION the SOUL that is everywhere, 
and in each; and forms all into one graceful and intelligent whole.”  Coleridge 
deemed fanciful work as not only more casual and superficial than imagination but 
as of an altogether different order.  One reason for this transcendental distinction 
was that fancy represented the only creativity possible under the various systems of 
British empiricism while his concept of the imagination developed quite differently, 
with his encounter with German transcendental philosophy.  Various British 
authors before Coleridge had proffered distinctions between fancy and imagination; 
indeed coining variations on this very distinction was a fashionable parlour game 
among aesthetes of the 18th Century.  Coleridge’s originality in this matter lies on 
the weight and meaning he gives to the terms.  Coleridge’s distinction between 
fancy and imagination can clearly be read as part of a system that retained a place 
for British empiricism, a necessary one, but one within the lower orders of the 
system.  Coleridge found the associationism of the empiricists as completely unable 
to account for artistic genius and creativity. It seems that Coleridge never wholly 
abandoned any position he held, preferring to award spoils from the succeeding 
system.  In retaining elements of empiricism in his philosophy of “spiritual 
realism,” Coleridge upheld Leibniz’s injunction to “collect the fragments of truth 
scattered throughout systems apparently the most incongruous.”34 
Primary imagination is an unconscious act necessary for all human 
perception. Imagination becomes secondary, in either its poetic or philosophical 
form, when it becomes conscious, or at least moves closer to consciousness.  In ‘On 
Poesy or Art’, Coleridge wrote that “there is in genius itself an unconscious activity; 
nay, that is the genius in the man of genius.”   In the Notes and Lectures on 
Shakespeare he described a “genial understanding directing self-consciously a power 
and an implicit wisdom deeper even than our consciousness.” 
Coleridge’s notion of genius was bold, for he did not talk only of one artist’s 
genius for representation, another thinker’s genius for synthesis, and so on with 
particular exceptional abilities.  Rather, he directed his words to genius in general 
as that which reflects nature exemplified by events and phenomena; the artist 
polishes such forms in consciousness to make nature thought: 
In the objects of nature are presented, as in a mirror, all the possible elements, steps, and 
processes of intellect antecedent to consciousness, and therefore to the full development of 
the intelligential act; and man’s mind is the very focus of all the rays of intellect which are 
scattered throughout the images of nature. Now, so to place these images, totalized and 
fitted to the limits of the human mind, as to elicit from, and to superinduce upon, the forms 
themselves the moral reflections to which they approximate, to make the external internal, 
the internal external, to make nature thought, and thought nature–this is the mystery of 
genius in the fine arts. Dare I add that the genius must act on the feeling, that body is but a 
striving to become mind–that it is mind in its essence? 
In every work of art there is a reconcilement of the external with the internal; the conscious is 
so impressed on the unconscious as to appear in it. Yes, not to acquire cold notions–lifeless 
technical rules–but living and life-producing ideas, which shall contain their own evidence, 
the certainty that they are essentially one with the germinal causes in nature–his 
consciousness being the focus and mirror of both–for this does the artist for a time abandon 
the external realm in order to return to it with a complete sympathy with its internal and 
actual. For of all we see, hear, feel, and touch the substance is and must be in ourselves. 
‘On Poesy or Art’, 1818 lecture. 
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Coleridge coined the term “desynonymization” in his Biographia Literaria to 
help explain his distinction between fancy and imagination. Indeed his use of these 
terms required careful explanation because Coleridge inverted the traditional 
meanings of “fancy” and “imagination”.  “Fancy”, whose root is the Greek 
“phantasia”, originally meant a free play of the mind not tied to specific or definite 
images.  “Imagination”, insofar as it sometimes expressed a different meaning from 
fancy, traditionally referred to the capacity to generate images in the mind.  In 
Coleridge’s inversion, imagination became the higher, more creative, faculty and 
fancy became that by which we create fixed and definite images.  Coleridge 
explains, “It is not, I own, easy to conceive a more opposite translation of the Greek 
Phantasia than the Latin Imaginatio; but it is equally true that in all societies there 
exists an instinct of growth, a certain collective, unconscious good sense working 
progressively to desynonymize those words originally of the same meaning.”  On 
desynonymization, Coleridge believed, as he remarked in the fifth of his 
philosophical lectures, that, “The whole process of human intellect is gradually to 
desynonymize terms.” 
Coleridge provided many examples, taken mainly from English poetry, of 
fancy and imagination to illustrate his distinction.  Here is one example of fancy: 
 And like a lobster boyl’d the Morn 
 From black to red began to turn. 
No imaginative power could sanely fuse together the various images and 
meanings in this burlesque example of fancy at play, and fancy is defined as entirely 
different in kind from imagination.  Butler’s lines are as deliberately burlesque as 
Otway’s, “Lutes, lobsters, seas of milk, and ships of amber”- another product of 
fancy, coincidently mentioning lobsters, given by Coleridge.  Shakespeare’s ‘Venus 
and Adonis’ is the source of the following example of fancy adduced by Coleridge: 
 Full gently now she takes him by the hand, 
 A lily prison’d in a gaol of snow, 
 Or ivory in an alabaster band; 
 So white a friend engirts so white a foe. 
Here fancy aggregates various images as similes to represent the goddess’s 
hand taking that of her mortal lover.  In each image – the lily, the gaol, snow, ivory 
and alabaster – a likeness is shown, but the images, as “fixities and definites”, do not 
cohere; there is “no connexion natural or moral, but [they] are yoked together by the 
poet by means of some accidental coincidence.”35 
Choice, “an empirical phenomenon of the will”, rather than the will as 
principle of the mind’s being, has selected by association these images.  The 
properties of the various images are merely “aggregated” and not “co-adunated” 
(fittingly assembled), so they cannot interfuse to mutual enrichment.  Coleridge 
speculates here that Shakespeare employed fancy in order to distance his poetry 
from a cloying subject matter:   “Shakespeare writes in this poem, as if he were of 
another planet, charming you to gaze on the movements of Venus and Adonis, as 
you would on the dances of two vernal butterflies.”  Because the products of fancy 
produce “fixities and definites” that neither intermingle with each other, nor 
interfuse with the mind (of the poet or reader), they can be used to effect various 
moods all typified by a certain distance from the subject being considered or 
presented. In his earliest traced desynonymization of fancy and imagination, 
Coleridge noted that “Definites, be they Sounds or Images, must be thought of either 
as being or as capable of being, out of us”, that is to say, external to us in a way that 
cannot be said of imagination’s products.  He continues, “Nay, is this not faulty?––
for an Imagination quoad Imagination cannot be thought of as capable of being out 
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of us.  Answer.  No.  For while we imagine, we never do think thus.  We always 
think of it as an it, & intimately mix the Thing & the Symbol.” 
Staying with “Venus and Adonis”, Coleridge quotes an example of poetic 
imagination: 
 Look! how bright a star shooteth from the sky 
 So glides he in the night from Venus’ eye. 
“How many images and feelings”, comments Coleridge, “are here brought 
together without effort and without discord, in the beauty of Adonis, the rapidity of 
his flight, the yearning, yet hopelessness, of the enamored gazer, while a shadowy 
ideal character is thrown over the whole!”  Here imagination co-adunates separable 
meanings into one whole.  Importantly, the reader’s activity is also brought into 
play in this process.  “You feel him to be a poet,” notes Coleridge,  “inasmuch as 
for a time he has made you one––an active creative being.”  (Lectures on Shakespeare, 
I: 251) 
“You may conceive the difference in kind between the Fancy and the 
Imagination in this way, that if the check of the senses and the reason were 
withdrawn, the first would become delirium and the last mania.”36   It is an 
interesting observation that an excess of fancy tends towards delirium, whereas an 
excess of imagination may lead to mania.  Fancy is moved by association, with one 
impression recalling others in more or less rapid succession, like the free association 
of the psychoanalysts.  This delirium is a state of excitement and mental confusion, 
sometimes accompanied by hallucinations.  Working mainly with images, fancy 
brings together elements that are only accidentally related into a sometimes 
delightful, sometimes nightmarish, nonsense.  Imagination, on the other hand, 
works to fuse, unite and create meaningful wholes.  When the influence of the 
senses and the reason are reduced, the mind may move towards mania, formulating 
ever-greater units and systems of meaning around one central idea.  The central 
idea at the hub cannot bear to carry such a burgeoning weight of significance. 
The secondary imagination may be enjoined to the task of, “awakening the 
mind's attention to the lethargy of custom, and directing it to the loveliness and the 
wonders of the world before us; an inexhaustible treasure, but for which, in 
consequence of the film of familiarity and selfish solicitude, we have eyes, yet see 
not, ears that hear not, and hearts that neither feel nor understand.”37 
Fancy is, “always the ape, and too often the adulterator and counterfeit of our 
memory.”38  Passive fancy can become habituated and contribute to that “film of 
familiarity” that the poetic or philosophical imagination is tasked to replace with 
“the loveliness of the treasures of the world.”39  The lethargy of custom holds sway 
when the mind remains among passive fancy’s ready-made fixities and definites 
rather than rise to its active and creative potential.  When the active fancy is set to 
choose its images, there is the reduction of “the conceivable within the bounds of the 
picturable.”  In Chapter VI of Biographia Literaria, Coleridge shows the active fancy 
being involved in the creation of Hartley’s theory of “vibratiuncles” and as 
factitiously picturing something that cannot be seen, satisfying “the despotism of the 
eye” by promising that if we had better eyesight, then these unobservables could in 
fact be observed. 
For Coleridge, the principle of life is individuation.  This unifying principle 
in life both creates the unified life-world of an organism and also holds it somewhat 
apart as an individual in the world.  Primary imagination perceives a unified 
landscape, “a oneness, even as nature, the greatest of poets, acts upon us, when we 
open our eyes upon an extended prospect.” 40   Secondary imagination creates 
meaningful relations; fancy, however, simply brings together fixities & definites that 
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do not meaningfully belong together.  Empiricism divides the world into smaller 
components, but it can’t very well put it back together again.  In Theory of Life, 
Coleridge writes of “the power which discloses itself from within as the principle of 
unity in many.”  Here he also describes “totality dawning into individuation” with 
the development of life.  The unity in multeity becomes “more intense in 
proportion as it constitutes each particular thing a whole of itself; and yet more, 
again, in proportion to the number and interdependence of the parts which it unites 
as a whole.”41  As primary imagination allows for perception itself, secondary 
imagination expresses and intensifies (this verb is a Coleridgeism) perception’s 
unity in multeity of organically related parts in a whole.  It is the imagination’s 
symbolic activity that works with this unity in multeity. 
Fixities and definites are opaque, and analogies are opaque, which is to say 
that they do not, on their own, allow us to see through them into what they are 
intended to represent.  The imagination, however, allows the symbol to emerge as 
translucence.  Not only do they allow the intended object to be seen in and through 
them, they allow the logical object to be conceived in the first place, just as light is 
not clearly seen until it is “held” diffused in a diamond or crystal.  Here is an 
example from Coleridge.  The beautiful image of the pond-skater and its motion 
reflected on the sunny bottom of the stream appears in Coleridge’s ongoing 
discussion of association in Chapter Seven of Biographia Literaria as follows: 
Now let a man watch his mind while he is composing, or […] while he is trying to recollect a 
name; and he will find the process completely analogous.  Most of my readers will have 
observed a small water-insect on the surface of rivulets, which throws a cinque-spotted 
shadow fringed with prismatic colours on the sunny bottom of the brook; and will have 
noticed, how the little the animal wins its way up against the stream, by alternate pulses of 
active and passive motion, now resisting the current, and now yielding to it in order to 
gather strength and a momentary fulcrum for a further propulsion. This is no unapt emblem 
of the mind’s self-experience in the act of thinking. There are evidently two powers at work, 
which relatively to each other are active and passive; and this is not possible without an 
intermediate faculty, which is at once both active and passive. (In philosophical language, we 
must denominate this intermediate faculty in all its degrees and determinations, the 
imagination. But in common language, and especially on the subject of poetry, we 
appropriate the name to a superior degree of the faculty, joined to a superior voluntary 
controul over it.) 
When in the act of composition, or trying to recollect a name, the mind allows 
the stream of associations to flow until it feels confident to make the leap and land 
on the sought word it was seeking.  Coleridge’s introspection of the involuntary 
stream and the active thinker waiting to make a move at the appropriate time is a 
masterpiece of subtle psychological observation.  Coleridge evokes a natural 
phenomenon to grasp the process of thinking and understanding in metaphorical 
language. The movement of the pond-skater, gliding now by the current, now 
against it, visually stands for two opposite powers at work while thinking, for 
example while writing poetry. The active phase is an exertion of the will, the passive 
phase surrendering to the power of the current. Active and passive only in relation 
to each other, Coleridge adds, because the moment when the pond-skater ceases to 
resist the current and yields to it for a short duration is still a moment of, as it were, 
choice, which moment of choice is more literal in the human psychological example 
that the pond-skater charmingly emblemizes.  The dialectic of the motions propels 
the process. Concerning the creative process, in the active, self-conscious phase the 
mind is in control, and makes, for instance, compositional decisions.  Whereas in 
the passive phase it is controlled through a reliance on the inspiration from the 
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materials it works upon. Coleridge’s passage emphasizes the necessity of their 
balance. 
Katherine Wheeler, who tirelessly edited many of Coleridge’s previously 
unpublished manuscripts, claims that the metaphorical passages in Biographia most 
often thematize the act of understanding, and should be read self-reflexively. I think 
the water-insect passage in particular refers the reader to their own self-experience, 
to observe their own processes of thinking.42 
Engell and Bate, Coleridge’s editors for the Bollingen editions of the Collected 
Coleridge volumes, interpret the water-insect metaphor as anticipating the definition 
of imagination in Biographia Literaria’s Chapter Thirteen.  For them, the phrase “in 
all its degrees and determinations” differentiates the degrees there named as 
primary and secondary imagination. That state which is passive in relation to the 
other can thus be interpreted as the primary imagination of perception, which is an 
instinctive reflex of the mind. The water-insect yields to the power of the mightier 
current as the mind yields to a myriad of stimuli and composes a living picture of 
the surrounding world. Engell and Bate, conversely, interpret the active state as 
being the secondary, poetic imagination, which co-exists “with the conscious will.”  
The act of will instigates and controls the poetic imagination: “This power, first put 
in action by the will and understanding, and retained under their irremissive, 
though gentle and unnoticed, controul reveals itself in the balance or reconciliation 
of opposite or discordant qualities.”  It seems to me that Engell and Bate might be 
mistaken here, because in that passage Coleridge writes that between the active and 
the passive powers lies the intermediate faculty of imagination.  Imagination as a 
faculty (comprising primary and secondary imagination) cannot be the intermediate 
between primary and secondary imagination, as Engell and Bate’s interpretation 
would read. 
The intermediate aspect of imagination is explicitly described in Biographia.  
Coleridge’s grasp of imagination as a mediating term is perhaps best understood in 
light of his discussion of the strength of thinking in: 
leaving a middle state of mind more strictly appropriate to the imagination than any other, 
when it is, as it were, hovering between images. As soon as it is fixed on one image, it 
becomes understanding; but while it is unfixed and wavering between them, attaching itself 
permanently to none, it is imagination– a strong working of the mind.43 
A will exists, insists Coleridge, "whose function it is to control, determine, 
and modify the phantasmal chaos of association."44 It is clear that Coleridge is not 
merely talking about Hartley’s theory here, but about the chaos of free 
consciousness itself. Even as Coleridge enacts a form of stream-of-consciousness, 
and enacts a considerable feat of memory, he warns against that enactment. For 
what is stream-of-consciousness, really, besides a stream of association?   It is 
interspersed with acts of will, for one thing.  For Coleridge the "Act of Will" 
accordingly becomes not only the basis of the "PRINCIPLE, in which BEING AND 
THOUGHT COINCIDE," but also "the original and perpetual Epiphany" (Notebooks 
3: note 4265).  It also supports a prospective view of humanity in which "the will, 
and with the will all acts of thought and attention, are ... distinct powers, whose 
function it is to controul, determine, and modify the phantasmal chaos of 
association" (Biographia 1:116).  In Coleridge’s system, association provides a 
chaotic stream of material to be shaped and directed according to the uses decided 
by the will, sometimes inspired by reason and imagination, usually determined by 
understanding, and often directed back to the play of fancy and whim. 
More needs to be said to clarify the mysterious place and all-important role of 
reason in Coleridge’s system.   In the foregoing, we noted the role of reason in its 
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negative mode as the principle of contradiction.  This is placed squarely in the 
lower understanding.  When this principle itself is reflected upon, the thinking 
mind is apt to be impressed by the principle’s universality of applicability, and a 
glimmer of positive reason is perceived.  Positive reason in the human mind is 
more clearly observed in the use of symbolism, whereby imagination works to 
schematize the invisible Form or Idea into a “living educt”, a symbol to be 
imaginatively approached and contemplated, “consubstantial” with the idea itself.  
This idea is, of course, platonic, and we could do worse than consider Coleridge’s 
Platonism as we approach what he meant by the ideas of reason.  Coleridge 
considered himself a congenital Platonist, believing that all people fall naturally into 
one of two general kinds regarding the use of reason. 
'Every man is born an Aristotelian, or a Platonist. I do not think it possible that any one born 
an Aristotelian can become a Platonist; and I am sure no born Platonist can ever change into 
an Aristotelian. They are the two classes of men, beside which it is next to impossible to 
conceive a third. The one considers reason a quality, or attribute; the other considers it a 
power. I believe that Aristotle never could get to understand what Plato meant by an idea. ... 
Aristotle was, and still is, the sovereign lord of the understanding: the faculty judging by the 
senses. He was a conceptualist, and never could raise himself into that higher state, which 
was natural to Plato, and has been so to others, in which the understanding is distinctly 
contemplated, and, as it were, looked down upon, from the throne of actual ideas, or living, 
inborn, essential truths.' 
Table Talk, 2nd Edition, p. 95. 
Aristotle was a conceptualist, according to Coleridge, who never thought 
beyond the concepts of the understanding.  He considered reason to be a quality, or 
attribute of the mind, of a discourse, or a proposition, and so on.  Plato, on the other 
hand, considered reason to be a power.  Coleridge does not elaborate his meaning 
here, but perhaps we can imagine this power as similar to the Heraclitean logos, to 
Lao Tze’s Tao, and, as Coleridge related several times, to Baconian laws of nature. 
Plato’s allegory, itself imagistic, of the prisoners in the cave, in Book VII of 
The Republic, addresses the problem of appearance, the image and their relation to 
reality.  These prisoners compete for honours by creating systems to explain the 
reality and meaning of the shadows projected before them by a fire behind, unseen 
due to their severe neck shackles.  One prisoner escapes from the cave into the 
dazzling world outside, but he can at first only look at shadows, then colours, then 
three-dimensional objects, eventually to face the sun itself.  When he tries to free 
the remaining prisoners from their bondage to a world of inconstant shadows, he 
finds that they would rather kill him than allow him to rend them from the only 
world and reality they know. 
By his own account, Coleridge was a Platonist.  Although Plato illustrated 
philosophy with some of the subject’s most beautiful and memorable images, the 
official role of imagination in his system is rather a lowly one. Indeed Plato’s esteem 
for poetry was notably low.  In The Ion he denounced rhapsode as magnetism rather 
than mastery – a divinely inspired magnetic dynamis rather than more rational techne.  
Of course, this divine inspiration does provide assurance of poetry’s exalted origin, but on 
the other hand, it is to be seen as a gift from the gods, and not as the product of mastery and 
expertise.  It was the imaginative bias of the poets that led Plato to expel them from 
his ideal Republic.  This contrasts starkly with the importance of imagination in 
Coleridge’s system.  For Coleridge imagination is the faculty relating the human 
mind most closely to God  (although one could argue that this might be true in 
Plato too). 
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Certainly Coleridge accepted Plato’s metaphysics.  Here we see, neatly set in 
the image of the divided line from The Republic (509d-511e), reality divided into the 
realm of the Forms, or Ideas, and the sensible world.  The realm of the Forms, the 
intelligible world of universals, consists of the higher Forms reflected by the lower 
region of concepts and mathematical Forms.  The sensible world then reflects the 
realm of the Forms, with particular sensible objects that are in turn reflected in the 
mere images or shadows of things.  The metaphysical division between the realm 
of the Forms and the sensible world is reflected in the epistemological division 
between knowledge, which relates to Forms, and opinion or conjecture, relating to 
the sensible world.  In knowledge, pure reason relates to the higher Forms, while 
concepts and mathematical Forms make up the province of the understanding, 
subsuming the particular under the general.  In opinion, sensible things are 
accessible through sense perception and belief, with the lowly imagination being left 
with the mere images of things.  Hereby imagination is placed three distinct 
removes from the truest reality of the higher Forms.  Indeed it is four distinct 
removes from ultimate reality, which originates in the Form of the Good, from 
which originate the harmony and beauty we may contemplate in all of the other 
Forms.  Elsewhere Plato describes imagination as an “inner artist painting pictures 
in the soul” (Philebus, 39c).  This “inner artist” provides a mnemonic service, as 
“memory is like a block of wax into which our perceptions and thoughts stamp 
impressions” (Theatetus, 191c, d).45 
For Plato, thinking with created images involved a lower consciousness of 
reality than even sense perception and belief.  Our memory’s retentive capacity is 
essentially imagistic in its storing of impressions, and this capacity is less attuned to 
reality than direct contemplation of the Forms.  Between the imagistic impression 
and the contemplation of the Forms, is the written word.  With the written word, 
impressions are made on paper, a tablet, a screen and so on, and these impressions 
record relations between concepts, although these relations and concepts cannot 
always be faithfully retrieved with the same meaning with which they were 
originally inscribed.  This is part of the problem that Plato describes in The Phaedrus, 
when Socrates calls writing a pharmakon.  The pharmakon, the drug, is both remedy 
and poison. 
While Plato reserved a very humble place for imagination and the image in 
his system, there was indeed a place for them there.  Plato found their inclusion 
necessary, not least to allow the actual transmission and illustration of his teaching 
into other minds.  But with Plato’s ideal being the contemplation of the Forms 
beyond image and concept, he would certainly not have agreed with Aristotle’s 
view that, “the soul never thinks without a mental image (phantasma).”46  On this 
point Coleridge seems close to Aristotle’s position, but not exactly.  Coleridge 
noted that, “A whole Essay might be written on the danger of thinking without 
images.” 47   Coleridge’s note here, although in a similar spirit to Aristotle’s, 
contradicts Aristotle.  If Coleridge believed that the soul never thought without 
images, then he would not have been able to speak of the dangers of doing so.  
What Coleridge feared here, reminiscent of Kant, was the danger of thinking with 
concepts only, unaided by images.  This would not be to contradict Plato, because 
for the thoroughgoing Platonist, there is no possibility of thinking in terms of Forms 
or Ideas.  The Ideas can be contemplated but not conceived, or turned into concepts 
and used as fixed and definite counters.  Here is the fuller quote from Coleridge’s 
letter to Josiah Wedgewood:  “She interested me a good deal;”  Coleridge wrote of 
Wedgewood’s late governess, “she appears to me to have been injured by going out 
of the common way without any of that Imagination, which if it be a Jack o’Lanthorn 
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to lead us out of that way is however at the same time a Torch to light us whither we 
are going.  A whole Essay, […etc.].” The injury came from thinking in concepts 
only, traversing unknown terrain dialectically without the guiding lights, though 
they have their own Jack O’Lanthorn-like dangers, afforded by imagination. 
Coleridge held that we ought to think also with imaginative symbols, which he 
thought of as educts of ideas, and not aim to think by concepts alone. 
In a platonic vein, Coleridge discoursed on “Ideas of Reason.”  He 
distinguished them, parallel to Plato’s distinguishing them from mathemata and the 
theorems of dianoia, from“conceptions of the Understanding.”  With this very 
distinction, came the problem of defining the Ideas of Reason.  If Ideas of Reason 
transcended concepts, then their definition would appear to be impossible.  A 
conception of an Idea would only be the shadow of an Idea and would, of course, 
remain a concept.  Coleridge was very much alive to this problem, “Ideas and 
Conceptions are utterly disparate, and Ideas and Images are the negatives of each 
other.”48  This problem much exercised the neo-platonists, one of whose discourses 
was entitled ‘A Discourse on Truth, Which Cannot be Discussed.’  Coleridge could 
find no convenient gradus ad philosophiam from concepts to Ideas.  In Ideas he saw 
the union of universal with particular, much as Hegel saw the Notion as unifying 
particularity, universality and individuality as the concrete universal  (without 
their predicated universals, subjects would not be individuals at all, so universals 
are not just those predicates which group different individuals together).  
Particulars share a pervading identity or universal, which is the soul of the 
particulars. Coleridge describes the identity or universal of a particular as its “Law”, 
a Law “constitutive” of phenomena and “In the order of thought necessarily 
antecedent” to them revealing fragments of the Ideal world distinguished, “not from 
the real, but from the phenomenal.”49   
Coleridge presents us with objects perceived in experience and asks us to 
consider their predicates as universals.  In the light of Ideas, particulars are seen 
and understood as individualizations of universals.  The Law is that in phenomena 
which is antecedent to and constitutive of the objects in our experience. Coleridge 
understood Plato’s Ideas as “Living Laws” imbued with particularity.50  The aim of 
these Living Laws in human life is “to present that which is necessary as a whole 
consistently with the moral freedom of each particular act.”51  Coleridge sees 
evidence of a “directing idea” which shapes our ends, as “a chain of necessity, the 
particular links of which are free acts.”52 “You may see an Idea working in a man by 
watching his tastes and enjoyments, though he may hitherto have no consciousness 
of any other reasoning than that of conception and facts.”53  Indeed, “All men live 
in the power of Ideas which work in them, though few live in their light.”54  We 
detect here that for Coleridge, human Reason and its relation to Ideas was not 
entirely conscious.  While Coleridge held Aristotle to be the undisputed master of 
the Understanding, Plato surveyed the Understanding from a higher vantage and, 
“as it were, looked down upon, from the throne of actual ideas, or living, inborn, 
essential truths.”55 
In his seminal criticism, Coleridge holds up Shakespeare as literature’s master 
of the Ideal.  “In every one of his characters we find ourselves communing with the 
same human nature.  Everywhere we find the same human nature.  Everywhere 
we find individuality, nowhere mere portraiture.  The excellence of his productions 
is the union of the universal with the particular.  But the universal is the Idea.  
Shakespeare therefore studied mankind in the Idea of the human race, and he 
followed out that Idea in all its varieties by a method that never failed to guide his 
steps aright.” (Preliminary Treatise on Method, p. 41).  How may we hope to access, 
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like Shakespeare, the Ideas and live in their light?  According to Coleridge’s 
metaphysics, we all live in the power of Ideas, but it is another thing to befriend 
wisdom and live in, and choose to be guided by, their light. Could we not be 
mistaken in identifying the light of an Idea?  After all, Coleridge held Aristotle, the 
genius of the Understanding known for centuries simply as ‘The Philosopher’, to be 
a conceptualist unable to raise himself to that higher state natural to Plato. How 
could we tell if we had ever been, or have failed to be, illuminated by an Idea?  
Surely it could not come directly from sensory experience.  Nor would it come from 
what we could generalize from such experience, as that would rather be a 
conceptual booty, rightfully the acquisition of the understanding.  
Although many thinkers since and including Plato have appealed to different 
manners of Ideas being innate, Coleridge did not accept that as a feasible option. 
Echoing the Cambridge Platonists, whom he admired from a distance, he repudiated 
the doctrine of innate ideas.  Far from Coleridge’s position was Descartes’ 
conception of clear and distinct innate ideas.  Although Descartes’ model gave 
ideas independence from perception and will, it was an absurdity that Coleridge 
could not entertain because of Descartes’ “fanciful hypothesis” of “configurations of 
the brain which were as so many moulds to the influxes of the external world”.56  
Indeed Kant’s apparent support of Cartesian innate ideas was a distinct point where 
Coleridge parted company from Kant, as Coleridge’s spiritual realism opposed 
Kant’s idealism.  Coleridge did, however, agree that the configuration of the mind 
was endowed with “instincts and offices of Reason”.  With Kant, he saw these as 
necessary for experience, bringing “a unity into all our conceptions and several 
knowledges.  On this all system depends; and without this we could reflect 
connectedly neither in nature nor on our own minds.”57   Coleridge’s originality 
here was in insisting that the unifying idea must be found as arising out of 
experience and not as superimposed on it.  Abstractions of thought, as much as 
perceptions and images, may well obstruct the unifying principle and must be 
surmounted if we would ascend to the Idea.  Coleridge called for that experience in 
which outer and inner is united – wherein the whole experiencing mind is surveyed.  
From this survey Ideas such as life, freedom and our deeper purposes arise in our 
mind neither as objects given nor as impositions from our nature but “as deep 
calling to deep in the self-evolution of truth.”58  This unity would come from a 
ground common to mind and world:  Coleridge’s ens realissimum. 
This most real being would be the ground for all other realities and Ideas seen 
in their unity and truth.  As such it was, after a Platonic fashion, the Idea Idearum, 
the Idea of Ideas.  “The grand problem, the solution of which forms the final object 
and distinctive character of philosophy, is this:  for all that exists conditionally (that 
is, the existence of which is inconceivable except under the conditions of its 
dependency on some other as its antecedent) to find a ground that is unconditioned 
and absolute, and thereby to reduce the aggregate of human knowledge to a 
system.”59  Coleridge argued the indisputability of this ground from two facts.  
Firstly, scientific inquiry seeks the relations, or laws, as the ground of phenomena.  
Secondly, we conceive of a “ground common to the world and man”, which forms 
“the link or mordant by which philosophy becomes scientific and the sciences 
philosophical.”60  This ground would account for the general unity of experience, 
the general concord of reason and experience.  This was the ground that Hume 
declared did not exist – that our expectation of the sun rising tomorrow, or of a 
purse full of gold left on the pavement at Charing-Cross flying away like a feather 
are merely inferences brought about by the habits of witnessing constant 
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conjunctions of similarly associated events, the mind merely being "determined by 
custom to infer the one appearance from the other”.61 
This same ground Kant essayed to defend with the transcendental unity of 
apperception:  if the real causes of events could not be shown for things themselves, 
then at least phenomena might be shown to be necessarily unified in experience.  
But Coleridge did not set about to show the unity of experience alone.  As Hume 
had shown, this ground is not reachable by induction.  “If we use only the 
discursive reason we must be driven from ground to ground, each of which would 
cease to be a ground the moment we pressed in it.  We either must be whirled 
down the gulf of an infinite series, thus making our reason baffle the end and 
purpose of all reason, namely unity and system, or we must break off the series 
arbitrarily and affirm an absolute something which is causa sui.”62  The option of 
affirming a causa sui provides a break from the logic of the understanding, but this 
arbitrary break, was not seriously considered by Coleridge. 
We do, however know of one causative thing, and we know it from the inside, 
namely the will.  Coleridge gave priority to the will in human and universal 
consciousness.  Coleridge approached the Idea via an act of will.  “It is at once the 
distinctive and constitutive basis of my philosophy that I place the ground and 
genesis of my system, not, as others, in a fact impressed, much less in a 
generalization from facts collectively, least of all in an abstraction embodied in an 
hypothesis, in which the pretended solution is most often but a repetition of the 
problem in disguise.  In contradiction to this, I place my principle in an act – in the 
language of the grammarians I begin with the verb – but the act involves its reality” 
(Opus Maximum).  This affirmation of action is not the same as the Faust of Goethe 
who declared, “Im Anfang war die Tat!” (In the beginning was the deed!), for this act 
of Coleridge’s is his human access to the Idea, it says nothing of God or of the Word 
– also the Idea is held as anteceding the deed.   
Coleridge’s major divergences from Kant can be seen to stem from his 
Platonism.   
For Coleridge's “ideas of Reason” were not an innate conduit to extra-
phenomenal reality.  Rather he appreciated them as mental products and 
correspondents, and as the culminating stage of conscious development, mental 
counterparts of the laws of nature themselves.  These counterparts stand as 
“correlatives that suppose each other.” Here Coleridge harmonizes with Schelling, 
who wrote in his Natürphilosophie that “Mind is invisible Nature; Nature visible 
Mind.”   The Ideas are, in other words, “living and life producing ideas, which . . . 
are essentially one with the germinal causes in nature,” and so are “constitutive” of 
the generative principles which they represent in the realm of awareness.  Reason 
in Coleridge’s system, it must be stressed, is not a faculty, even as imagination and 
understanding can be thought of as faculties. 
Coleridge remained loyal to the neoplatonists he studied and said that 
Plotinus provided “the statement in his most beautiful language of the only possible 
form of philosophic Realism,” as well as furnished “the demonstration of it by one 
of the most masterly pieces of exhaustive logic found in ancient or modern 
writings.”  “Let the attempt of Plotinus have ended in failure, yet who could see the 
courage and skill, with which he seizes the reins and vaults into the chariot of the 
sun, without sharing his enthusiasm and taking honour to the human mind even to 
have fallen from such magnificent daring?”63  Coleridge was defending Plotinus’s 
principle, which Tennemann “so cavalierly kicked out of the ring,” that, namely, 
whatever is necessary to reality is necessarily real itself.  Plotinus demonstrated, 
rallied Coleridge, that “a knowledge of Ideas is a constant process of involution and 
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evolution, different from the concepts of the understanding in this respect only, that 
no reason can be brought for the affirmation, because it is reason.  The soul (for 
example) contemplates its principle (which is) the universal in itself, as a particular, 
i.e. knows that this truth is involved and vice versa evolves itself from its principle.”  
Here we find the beauty of the poet-philosopher’s quarry, the identity of act and 
object in the neoplatonic act of contemplation, an act involving the reality of the Idea.  
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